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INTRODUCTION 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the 
Supreme Court asserted that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are “unquestionably 
shielded” under the First Amendment.1  Previously, visual art’s main doctrinal 
residence stood in obscenity law’s backyard, as a vague definitional tautology:  art 
constitutes speech so long as it is not obscene,2 and speech is not obscene if it is 
art.3  The Hurley Court offered no elaboration as to the “drip” painting’s 
constitutional relevance,4 but, even as mere illustrative dictum, the declaration 
received independent attention on two levels.  First, the remark reified a 
longstanding assumption that visual art was “speech,” offering a specific example 
outside the realm of obscenity law.5  Second, the reference to Jackson Pollock’s 
painting did not merely confer robust protection to art, but definitively extended its 
embrace to apolitical, nonlinguistic imagery.6 
 
 1. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (remarking that if a “particularized message” was required for 
constitutional protection, the First Amendment “would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting 
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll”).  This Article 
focuses on visual art.  Because Jabberwocky involves words, it possesses a more direct route to speech 
status than purely visual expression.  Instrumental music may be closer categorically, but is likewise 
beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discussion of instrumental music as speech, see Alan K. Chen, 
Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (2015).  This Article refers to First 
Amendment law only in relation to the free speech clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).  It focuses on what constitutes 
First Amendment speech, rather than whether a given instance of speech is protected under particular 
circumstances.  See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769–71 (2004) (distinguishing 
between coverage—whether the First Amendment “shows up” in the first instance—and protection). 
 2. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973) (“As with pictures, films, paintings, 
drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the printed word have First Amendment protection 
until they collide with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not protected by the 
Constitution.”). 
 3. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (work can be considered obscene only if it 
lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”); see also Mark Tushnet, Art and the First 
Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 208 (2012) (“Throughout its efforts to define obscenity, the 
Court has simply assumed that material that can be described as sufficiently artistic cannot be 
obscene.”). 
 4. The Court does not specify any particular painting or that it is referring to Pollock’s 
nonrepresentational work, but there is no reason to question this inference.   
 5. See Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1 (2008) (citing 
Hurley among cases demonstrating “wide agreement that art speech is protected speech”); Sheldon 
Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and The First 
Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 242 (1987) (noting the absence of discussion about the place of 
artistic expression in the marketplace of ideas, despite “the unquestioned assumption that somehow it 
belongs there”). 
 6. See Genevieve Blake, Expressive Merchandise and the First Amendment in Public Fora, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049, 1058 (2007) (quoting the Hurley holding as signifying “a clear, indeed 
‘unquestionable’ protection for apolitical artworks”); David Greene, Why Protect Political Art as 
“Political Speech”?, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 364 (2005) (suggesting increasingly 
expanding embrace of artistic expression such that, “by 1995, the Court had realized the 
‘unquestionable’ First Amendment protection due even abstract works”); Paul E. Salamanca, Video 
Games As A Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153, 164 (2005) (describing Hurley as an 
embrace of “even pure art”); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
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No one questions that conclusion.  As Mark Tushnet has aptly observed, it is 
correct by “clearly widespread intuition.”7  But, as Tushnet has also explained, the 
result for legal reasoning is highly conflicted.8  And, from the vantage of traditional 
First Amendment principles, no one can agree on why the conclusion is correct.9  
To the extent that speech, fundamentally, requires communication, how can it 
encompass expression devoid of words, discernable message, or shared meaning?10 
The three most commonly-cited purposes in explaining the scope of the free 
speech clause include:  (1) protecting a robust marketplace of ideas in the ongoing 
quest for truth;11 (2) enabling informed participation in a democracy;12 and (3) 
ensuring the liberty of self-realization or individual autonomy.13  But if ideas—
especially political ideas—are the crown jewels of speech serving any of these 
objectives,14 why does art deemed “noncognitive”15 and apolitical share this 
 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 499 (2011) (observing that “rigorous protection 
has been extended across the board even to art that has no political purpose”). 
 7. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 197. 
 8. These anomalies are the subject of Tushnet’s comprehensive discussion of art and First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  See generally Tushnet, supra note 3.  
 9. A definitive First Amendment theory has never been settled for the larger category of 
nonpolitical visual art.  See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1784–87 (listing art among “outcomes in search of 
a theory”). 
 10. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 194 (“It is entirely unclear whether anyone imputes any 
meaning to [Blue Poles, No. 11], much less a political meaning, and whatever meanings are imputed are 
unlikely to be shared widely enough to make the painting a word equivalent.”). 
 11. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private 
licensee.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”); see 
also C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 982 (2009) 
(noting that beginning in the 1970s, “virtually all First Amendment scholarship and the dominant 
doctrinal formulations accepted some version of a marketplace of ideas theory”); Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1455 (2013) (referring to the marketplace 
of ideas rationale as the “most commonly invoked by the Supreme Court”); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward 
a General Theory of The First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (describing traditional view of 
free expression as “the best process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth”). 
 12. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011) 
(defining “speech” as “speech acts and media of communication that are socially regarded as necessary 
and proper means of participating in the formation of public opinion”).  
 13. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 966 (1978) (arguing that “speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the 
value of speech conduct to the individual”); Emerson, supra note 11, at 879 (“The right to freedom of 
expression is justified first of all as the right of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual.”); 
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled ‘individual self-
realization.'”). 
 14. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (referring to political speech as 
“central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 
(2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” 
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003))); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”).  
 15. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Art and the Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1598 (2008) 
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constitutional eminence?  The only well-theorized purpose that readily 
accommodates protecting nonrepresentational art as speech is self-realization as an 
end unto itself (rather than in service of the other two goals),16 a purpose that, Lee 
Bollinger observes, “has never achieved the widely accepted status in First 
Amendment jurisprudence of the other two.”17  In this light, the Hurley Court’s 
certainty about the First Amendment stature of Jackson Pollock’s painting is 
striking, and no less the unanimity among legal scholars that nonrepresentational 
art stands among the “core cases of protected expression.”18 
This Article is not aimed at resolving that jurisprudential debate.  Rather, this 
Article argues that its framework is both a cause and symptom of First Amendment 
law’s disconnect from contemporary artistic expression.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Hurley and its overwhelming approval are informed and 
framed by a particular art historical moment—one that no longer reflects the art 
world.  This outdated cultural lens restricts, rather than expands, how artistic 
expression is conceptualized as speech.  To place First Amendment law on solid 
footing with visual artistic expression, the law needs to open its eyes to the changes 
that have occurred over the past half-century. 
My approach relies on art historical sources to help break through the discursive 
paralysis generated by a subject that law is loath to address,19 yet, by exultant 
 
(“Art, as I use the term here, is a representation perceived not mainly through our cognitive faculties, but 
instead through our senses unconstrained by reason.”); Nahmod, supra note 5, at 241 (describing 
nonrepresentational art as a type of “noncognitive” communication); Melvin B. Nimmer, The Meaning 
of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 35 (1973) (referring to 
nonrepresentational art as “substantially devoid of all cognitive content”); Kevin Saunders, Media 
Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107, 165 
(1994) (describing nonrepresentational art as communicating noncognitive, “emotive messages”).  
Although I find the term “noncognitive” misplaced, I use it consistent with the conventions of legal 
commentary as meaning lacking a propositional idea. 
 16. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 271 (2011) 
(explaining First Amendment coverage of abstract art as a matter of the expressive liberty of artists and 
audiences); Baker, supra note 13. 
 17. Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN 
THE MODERN ERA 1, 23 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“It is well accepted among 
the justices and legal scholars today that the fundamental purpose of free speech is to maximize the 
search for truth and to protect the democratic decisionmaking process.”); see also Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Chi., 480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Self-expression is not to be equated to the expression of 
ideas or opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace.”); ROBERT C. POST, 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 23 (2012) (arguing that the law must distinguish 
between situations where a person should have autonomy and those where the person is dependent); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2002) 
(claiming that protecting art on the basis of individual self-realization frames art “too narcissistically”); 
Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1289–93 (1983) (canvassing 
reasons why autonomy-based theories are not distinguishable from general principles of personal liberty, 
and thus insufficient to explain the constitutional distinction afforded “speech”). 
 18. See Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 893 (2007) (declaring 
that “all would agree” that nonrepresentational art is speech, “even if no one can say exactly what the 
message might be”).   
 19. Judging art was famously deemed off-limits in early twentieth century law.  See Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
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refrain, “goes without saying.”20  I do not suggest that law should take art history 
into account when analyzing nonrepresentational art.  Rather, it already has.  
Nonrepresentational art in contemporary First Amendment discourse reflects the 
legacy of a deeply symbolic cultural construct forged in twentieth-century 
modernism.  The reference to Jackson Pollock’s painting in Hurley is its anemic 
residue. 
While Mark Tushnet has probed the analytical complexities of including 
Pollock’s painting within the scope of the free speech clause, he, like other 
scholars, reasons backwards from the historical outcome of American modernism.  
The art historical lens established by the modernist era, however, is not a reliable 
means of contemplating the First Amendment’s relationship to artistic expression 
today.  Postmodernism (loosely defined)21 challenged modernism’s normative 
architecture and strategically engaged previously segregated forms of culture, like 
advertising, politics, and entertainment media.  It used concept to break through the 
fortress of pure visuality.  It tore down the romantic ideal of individual authorship 
by celebrating mass production and appropriation. 
Postmodernism’s conceptual orientation and dissolution of boundaries might 
First Amendment law’s broadly inclusive marketplace of ideas, but instead art and 
law speak past one another.  The result of Jackson Pollock as the exemplar of 
constitutionally covered visual art is not simply a matter of over- or under-
inclusion, but a doctrine and discourse that is reductive, anachronistic, and 
culturally alienated.22 
In Part I, I provide background illustrating the cultural entanglement of freedom 
of expression with the vanguard art movement Abstract Expressionism, whose 
ascent to mainstream success occurred in tandem with the rise of U.S. political and 
economic strength in the years following World War II.  In Part II, I briefly 
describe the postmodern insurgency against the dictates of high modernism, 
especially the latter’s apparent isolation from social concerns and thrall to the 
individual genius paradigm.  In Part III, I examine the migration of modernist 
 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).  This nexus of aesthetic 
judgment and judicial reasoning has been probed in legal literature.  See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, 
Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 811–13 (2005) (arguing that despite proclaimed reluctance to engage 
in aesthetic judgments based on inherent subjectivity, judges do so implicitly); Richard A. Posner, Art 
for Law’s Sake, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 513, 514 (1989) (“[W]hile it is possible to make objective 
measurements of physical properties such as weight and speed, it is not possible to make such 
measurements of artistic value, because people having different values and preferences do not agree and 
cannot be brought to agree on how to determine the presence of that attribute and even how to define 
it.”); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (arguing 
that judicial opinions on copyright law contain implicit views on aesthetic theory). 
 20. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It 
goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First Amendment protection.”). 
 21. This Article makes no claim to definitively characterizing postmodernism and uses the term 
primarily as a means of referencing artistic developments historically situated after modernism, in 
relation to the themes and theories discussed.   
 22. Although this Article doesn’t delve into the intersection of free speech with the fair use 
doctrine, several points made here about law’s dissonance with postmodern art are manifest in copyright 
cases involving appropriation art, a subject incisively examined in Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future 
of Art,  91(3) N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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culture into First Amendment case law, leading up to the Supreme Court’s embrace 
of Jackson Pollock’s painting as speech in Hurley, followed by its dissonant legacy 
in contemporary jurisprudence.  In Part IV, I demonstrate the ways in which 
contemporary legal discourse involving nonrepresentational art remains 
circumscribed by the art historical vision of modernism, perpetuating law’s acute 
misalignment with postmodern art and culture. 
Rather than advancing another normative theory aimed at justifying 
nonrepresentational art as speech, this Article argues that modernism raised the 
question, and paralyzed the inquiry.  Closing the culture gap requires seeing the 
law’s invisible art museum and its implicit interpretive construct.  These walls 
should be razed, opening up the discursive field to facilitate a more meaningful 
integration of art with contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. 
I.  THE CULTURAL ALLIANCES OF MODERNISM AND FREE SPEECH 
The First Amendment is not only law, but a national identity.23  Despite its 
pervasive cultural presence,24 the law distinguishes between constitutionally-
protectable speech and regular speech.25  That is, not all spoken or written 
expression triggers a First Amendment analysis (language susceptible to 
government regulation occurs, for example, in the context of contract, fraud, 
conspiracy, and copyright law).  Frederick Schauer proposes that speech 
boundaries are best explained descriptively, rather than by normative theory, 
through the particular social and historical conditions of the First Amendment’s 
development.26  In Schauer’s view, the distinction between covered and uncovered 
speech “is a function of largely nondoctrinal forces.”27  Not unrelatedly, 
constitutional law scholars have observed that contemporary free speech discourse 
is a product of the twentieth century, during which time speech jurisprudence 
became increasingly protective.28  
This section provides a descriptive account of Abstract Expressionism, the 
preeminent artistic outpost of modernism in post-World War II America.29  I offer 
 
 23. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 
(1990) (“America has had a romance with the first amendment.”).  
 24. Id. at 87 (observing that “the first amendment plays a role in American culture that ranges 
beyond its legal bounds”). 
 25. See POST, supra note 17, at 15 (referring to “vast stretches of ordinary verbal expression” that 
are excluded from “speech” for First Amendment purposes); Schauer, supra note 1, at 1777 (observing 
that it would be a mistake to assume that all speech beyond the defined exclusions is covered by the 
First Amendment).  This Article uses the word “speech” to denote First Amendment speech, unless 
otherwise specified. 
 26. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1787 (arguing that speech boundaries are best revealed in the 
“political, sociological, cultural, historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First 
Amendment exists and out of which it has developed”). 
 27. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1788. 
 28. See Bollinger & Stone, supra note 17, at 1 (observing that the contemporary First 
Amendment “is an invention of the twentieth century”). 
 29. DAVID ANFAM, ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM 7 (1990) (describing Abstract Expressionism as 
“a landmark in the general history of art and of modern art in particular”).  I refer to “Abstract 
Expressionism” in relation to the artists and abstract work most associated with this name in post-World 
 BONNEAU, EX POST MODERNISM, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 195 (2015)  
2015] EX POST MODERNISM 201 
it as backstory to the widespread assumption—a foregone conclusion in Hurley—
that nonrepresentational art belongs within the scope of the free speech clause.  The 
notoriously indecipherable, apolitical, and nonrepresentational work of the Abstract 
Expressionists acquired a unique First Amendment salience in the 1950s, in culture 
rather than in legal doctrine.30  This symbolic alliance was fortified by particular 
historical, social, and political conditions, yet, as will be explained, preconditioned 
on the irrelevance of these same influences. 
I divide this selective overview of Abstract Expressionism into two parts, 
broadly reflecting relevant shifts in associated public perceptions and rhetoric.31 
A.  THE POLITICS OF MODERNISM 
In the early twentieth century, modern art—in the form of abstraction—was 
European.  America’s art historical tradition was seeded and cultivated in realism, a 
style reflecting this country’s Puritan roots and, art historians have suggested, a 
defiance of societal perceptions that art was an “unmanly,” dishonest, and fanciful 
pursuit.32  In the 1930s, realist art was both explicitly and implicitly influenced by 
political and economic conditions, and often avowedly nationalistic, as under New 
Deal art programs like the Federal Art Project.33  Thomas Hart Benton’s regionalist 
paintings and murals, for example, captured this liberal-democratic spirit through 
an idealized iconography of social reform and American progress.34  Even less 
idealized paintings of labor by American social realists, like Ben Shahn, were 
consistent with the idea of a distinctly American art predicated on literal 
representation—accessibility was itself a democratic principle.35 
First generation Abstract Expressionists, including Jackson Pollock and Willem 
de Kooning, became acquainted through New Deal art programs in the 1930s, 
 
War II America, especially Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning.  Abstract Expressionism was not 
actually a movement, in the sense of a shared intent or mission, but the degree of unanimity among the 
artists does not significantly impact the thesis of this Article. 
 30. See generally Ann Gibson, Abstract Expressionism’s Evasion of Language, 47 ART J. 208 
(1988) (discussing major art historical theories explaining the Abstract Expressionists’ defiance of 
verbal translation). 
 31. This organization should not be construed as linear in a temporal sense; conflicting theories 
and interpretations intersected at all stages.   
 32. IRVING SANDLER, THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN PAINTING 7 (1970) (“In a society whose 
business was business, artistic creation was suspect as an unmanly and frivolous evasion of reality.”); 
LEO STEINBERG, Other Criteria, in OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
ART 55, 56–58 (1972) (discussing realist Thomas Eakins as the quintessential “American artist” because 
he attempted to assimilate the role of the painter with the Puritan work ethic:  devoid of sentiment, 
efficient, and honest).  
 33. See PAUL WOOD ET AL., MODERNISM IN DISPUTE: ART SINCE THE FORTIES 12–16 (1993) 
(detailing political activism of artists in the 1930s and social agenda of Federal Art Project). 
 34. Benton’s narrative-based depictions of American life, along with his preference for publicly-
accessible murals, were tied to political and social reform, including disavowal of New York’s elitist art 
world.  See Erika Doss, The Art of Cultural Politics: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism, in 
RECASTING AMERICA: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF COLD WAR 195, 200 (Lary May ed., 
1989).  
 35. See Jane de Hart Mathews, Art and Politics in Cold War America, 81 AM. HIST. REV. 762, 
782 (1976). 
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working in a generally realistic style.36  These New York-based artists looked to 
new sources in the 1940s, including European abstraction and surrealism,37 
becoming an avant-garde art movement (also referred to as the “New York 
School”), whose ascent dramatically steepened in the years following World War 
II. 
Clement Greenberg, the art critic credited with the greatest influence in shaping 
the cultural reception and legacy of Abstract Expressionism, is renowned for his 
post-war aesthetic theory of formalism.  Formalist artistic critique, broadly stated, 
assesses the art object as autonomous and self-justifying by its surface qualities of 
form and color.  But Greenberg originally developed formalist art theory in 
conjunction with specific social and political concerns.  In Avant-Garde and Kitsch, 
from 1939, he explained mass culture (“kitsch”) as the inexpensive means by which 
“totalitarian regimes seek to ingratiate themselves with their subjects,” which 
avant-garde painters could refute by divesting representation from the picture 
plane.38  The artist’s “search of the “absolute,”39 inherently rejecting bourgeois 
society and capitalism, would clear the path to social revolution by preserving 
genuine culture, which unlike kitsch, resisted exploitation.40 
Abstract art was not rejected by fascists and Stalinists as too critical of 
government, Greenberg claimed, but rather, unlike mass culture, “too innocent . . . 
too difficult to inject effective propaganda into . . . .”41  Greenberg continued to 
fine-tune his theory, offering an art historical trajectory toward abstraction that 
began after Romanticism, when “the avant-garde saw the necessity of an escape 
from ideas, which were infecting the arts with the ideological struggles of 
society.”42  Manet, for example, was transformative in this move away from 
representational content to a more socially impenetrable focus on the material 
essence of painting:  acknowledgment of the flat picture plane.43 
Post-war society, however, complicated Greenberg’s revolutionary social lens, 
and the socialist leanings of other New York intellectuals.  Indeed, the deeply 
subjective, inward turn of Abstract Expressionist painting paralleled a systemic 
 
 36. Pollock trained under Thomas Hart Benton in the 1930s. 
 37. One key channel was New York’s Museum of Modern Art.  See Susan Noyes Platt, 
Modernism, Formalism, and Politics: The “Cubism and Abstract Art” Exhibition of 1936 at the Museum 
of Modern Art, 47 ART J. 284 (1988).  Moreover, by the mid-1940s, émigrés from Europe had entered 
the New York art world, including French surrealists (Yves Tanguy, Andre Masson, Andre Breton), 
abstract artists Josef Albers and Hans Hofmann from Germany, and Dutch artist Piet Mondrian.  See de 
Hart Mathews, supra note 35, at 773–74 (noting that the émigré community in New York included the 
leaders of nearly every twentieth-century non-realistic art movement). 
 38. CLEMENT GREENBERG, AVANT-GARDE AND KITSCH (1939), reprinted in CLEMENT 
GREENBERG, ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 3, 19 (1961). 
 39. Id. at 5.  
 40. See id. at 10–12, 19 (discussing mass culture in connection with urbanization, 
industrialization, and commodification of “genuine culture”); see also T.J. Clark, In Defense of Abstract 
Expressionism, OCTOBER 22, 41 (Summer 1994) (contrasting Greenberg’s early “Trotskyite” use of the 
term kitsch, having class connotations, with mid-1950s formalist concerns). 
 41. GREENBERG, supra note 38, at 19. 
 42. Clement Greenberg, Towards a Newer Laocoon, 7 PARTISAN REV. 296, 301 (1940). 
 43. Id. at 302, 308.  
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disillusionment with and withdrawal from socio-economic theories of society 
toward individualism and psychological motives.44  As the Romantic author 
paradigm of individual genius flourished,45 the painters’ work increasingly resisted 
verbal interpretation.46  And as conventional iconographic systems of 
communication receded from the picture plane and became entirely unintelligible, 
extrinsic theories of meaning proliferated, colored by post-war themes of the 
individual unconscious, Jungian psychology, antirationalism, and the primitive.47 
Although the growing censorial impulse toward art in general may have initially 
targeted the “un-American” messages of certain realist works, abstract art was not 
immune from political interpretation.48  In the incipient climate of fear leading into 
McCarthyism, Michigan Congressman George Dondero became the dominant 
voice of communist accusations in art.49  Although he did not hesitate to decry the 
apparent communist messages in naturalistic art,50 he directed his sharpest vitriol at 
European abstraction or “modern art.”51  Seizing on the widespread paranoia of 
communist infiltration, Dondero highlighted nonrepresentational art’s foreign roots, 
its apparent pictorial disorder, and its elitist disavowal of public comprehension to 
press one message:  abstract form was inherently threatening to American values 
 
 44. See MICHAEL LEJA, REFRAMING ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM: SUBJECTIVITY AND PAINTING 
IN THE 1940S 194–202 (1993) (discussing psychological bent of Jackson Pollock’s work in relation to 
broad social trends); see also David John Frank & John W. Meyer, The Profusion of Individual Roles 
and Identities in the Postwar Period, 20 SOC. THEORY 88 (2002) (discussing “dramatic rise in the 
cultural centrality of individual rights” during Cold War).   
 45. For a discussion of how these social trends influenced copyright law, see Peter Jaszi, Is There 
Such a Thing as a Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105 (2009). 
 46. Gibson, supra note 30, at 208. 
 47. Gibson, supra note 30, at 209–10; ANN EDEN GIBSON, ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM: OTHER 
POLITICS 18–19 (1997) (describing impact of post-war “age of anxiety” in response to Abstract 
Expressionism). 
 48. See de Hart Mathews, supra note 35, at 763. 
 49. See de Hart Mathews, supra note 35, at 776.  
 50. One of the most prominent controversies involved a government-funded mural project at San 
Francisco’s Rincon Post Office Annex, unveiled in 1949.  The murals, depicting the history of San 
Francisco, were painted in a stylized realism by Russian-born artist Anton Refregier.  The artist’s 
background and leftist activities had already made him suspect, but critics also denounced the elongated 
style and claimed the content disproportionately emphasized violence, racial hatred, and class struggle.  
In 1953, Dondero appointed a subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works to consider their 
removal, describing the murals as “an insult to every loyal American.”  de Hart Mathews, supra note 35, 
at 765–66. 
 51. In 1949, Dondero made an oft-quoted speech: 
Picasso, who is also a Dadaist, an abstractionist, or a surrealist, as unstable fancy dictates, is the 
hero of all the crackpots in so-called modern art . . . .  The evidence of evil design is everywhere 
. . . .  The question is, what have we, the plain American people, done to deserve this sore 
affliction that has been visited upon us so direly; who has brought down this curse upon us; who 
has let into our homeland this horde of germ-carrying art vermin? 
95 CONG. REC. 11, 584–85 (1949) (statement of Rep. Dondero).  Dondero was also hostile to museums, 
particularly the Museum of Modern Art.  He singles out Paul J. Sachs, an honorary trustee, explaining 
that as head of the Fogg Museum, Sachs “accepted, nurtured, and exalted the whole school of so-called 
modern and contemporary art, but more catastrophic than that, the Fogg Museum . . . trained many of its 
effeminate elect to be directors of museums throughout our land.”  Id. at 11, 586. 
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and ideals.52 
The contradiction—Stalin endorsed dramatic battlefield victories and romantic 
pastoral scenes, not abstraction—did not necessarily go unnoticed.53  But 
Dondero’s arguments struck a chord with fellow conservatives and intersected with 
an intra-cultural battle between realism and abstraction playing out in artistic 
circles.54  Artists who had achieved lucrative commissions working in the realistic 
tradition viewed the rise of abstraction with some concern, and were not averse to 
assisting in Dondero’s political attacks.55 
Although the extent of Dondero’s influence is unknown, his scaremongering 
prompted several protests of government-sponsored art exhibitions (often joined by 
traditional academic artists and illustrators),56 the first being the State Department’s 
exhibition, Advancing American Art.57  The exhibition, slated to travel Europe and 
Latin America as part of a cultural exchange program,58 was ultimately cancelled 
upon report by the House Committee on un-American Activities that over twenty 
of the artists selected were “definitely New Deal in various shades of 
communism.”59  The exhibit was declared “as foreign to the American way as is 
the Moscow radio.”60  Other than citing Jackson Pollock and two other Abstract 
Expressionists among the alleged subversives,61 however, Dondero never 
precipitated direct censorship of these artists.62  Censorial controversies like the 
 
 52. de Hart Mathews, supra note 35, at 772, 776; see also William Hauptman, The Suppression of 
Art in the McCarthy Decade, ARTFORUM, 48, 48 (Oct. 1973).   
 53. See Howard Devree, Modernism Under Fire: Newest Attack is Full of Contradictions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1949, at X6 (countering that “it is the sturdy individualism, the refusal of modernism to 
become propaganda or to cater to the anecdotal and the illustrative that have led to its suppression under 
totalitarian governments”); see also 95 CONG. REC. 12,099 (1949) (statement of Rep. Javits) (“The very 
point which distinguishes our forum of free expression from communism is the fact that modern art can 
live and flourish here without state authority or censorship and be accepted by Americans who think 
well of it.”). 
 54. ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART 120 (1995) (discussing “almost theological 
intensity” of division between abstraction and realism); Bradford Collins, Life Magazine and the 
Abstract Expressionists, 1948–51: A Historiographic Study of a Late Bohemian Enterprise, 73 ART 
BULL. 283, 285 (1991) (discussing polarization among critics supporting abstraction versus realism); 
Aline B. Louchheim, The ABC (or XYZ) of Abstract Art, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1948, at SM16. 
 55. See de Hart Mathews, supra note 35, at 775–77. 
 56. de Hart Mathews, supra note 35. 
 57. See Hauptman, supra note 52, at 49 (quoting accusations that works selected for exhibition 
were products of “left-wing painters who are members of Red fascist organizations”); Louis Menand, 
Unpopular Front: American Art and the Cold War, NEW YORKER 174, 175 (Oct. 17, 2005) (book 
review) (discussing attack on exhibition by conservative artist organization).   
 58. The State Department regularly sponsored traveling exhibitions pursuant to a Cultural 
Cooperation Program initiated in 1938.  See Hauptman, supra note 52, at 48. 
 59. See 93 CONG. REC. 5,220 (1947) (statement of Rep. Busbey) (referring to the art exhibit as a 
“disgrace to the United States” and having “sinister aspects”).   
 60. Id. at 5,221. 
 61. See 95 CONG. REC. 11,585 (1949) (statement of Rep. Dondero) (including abstract artists 
Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell, and William Baziotes as “American satellites” of other 
subversives). 
 62. Notably, the State Department exhibition from 1947 did not include Abstract Expressionist 
work, but other American artists experimenting with abstraction, e.g., Milton Avery, Stuart Davis, 
Georgia O’Keefe, etc. 
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State Department’s cancelled exhibition, however, offered content to the rhetoric of 
“freedom of expression” adopted by the art community.63 
Moreover, in response to Dondero’s charges that modernism constituted a vast 
communist conspiracy, a counteroffensive was launched.  The aesthetic thesis was 
laid out by Alfred Barr, Director of The Museum of Modern Art, in, Is Modern Art 
Communistic?, a letter published in The New York Times.64  Barr argued, 
essentially, that political involvement led to bad art (realism), and a lack of political 
intervention resulted in high quality art (abstraction).  “Let’s look at the record in 
Russia and Germany,” he instructed readers, contrasting photographic 
reproductions of bland historical paintings “admired and honored” in Soviet Russia 
and Nazi Germany with works by Van Gogh and Chagall, “hated and feared” under 
those regimes.65  Equating abstraction with communist ideology was merely a false 
accusation, Barr claimed, leveled by “resentful academic artists and their political 
mouthpieces in Congress and elsewhere.”66  Politics had to be purged from art for 
the sake of artistic quality. 
B.  THE APOLITICAL ART OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
“[F]reedom of the arts is a basic freedom, one of the pillars of liberty in our  
land . . . .  But, my friends, how different it is in tyranny.  When artists are made the 
slaves and the tools of the state; when artists become the chief propagandists of a 
cause, progress is arrested and creation and genius are destroyed.”67  
 
– Dwight D. Eisenhower  
 
The counteroffensive of art as both apolitical and American was wildly 
successful.  In the 1950s, Abstract Expressionism was recoded as an American 
avant-garde art movement.  The artists were cast as a blend of Romantic artists and 
rugged, archetypically male frontiersmen; as described by one art historian, their 
image was “100 percent heterosexual masculinity.”68  They were rebels, 
innovators, and, most prominently, “action painters.”69  The robust, gestural 
brushstrokes of their outsized canvases came to embody “the heroic pathos of 
 
 63. See Edward Alden Jewell, Federal Convention—Shows of the Week, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
1947, at X6 (describing symposium hosted by American Federation of Arts, “Freedom of Expression for 
Artists,” as a vital issue in light of attacks on State Department’s permanent collection and cancellation 
of traveling exhibitions).   
 64. Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Is Modern Art Communistic?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1952, at SM22.   
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.   
 67. Statement of Dwight D. Eisenhower at the 25th Anniversary of the Museum of Modern Art 
(Oct. 19, 1954), http://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/1874/releases/ 
MOMA_1954_0095_89.pdf?2010 [http://perma.cc/8DTJ-27ED].  
 68. Gibson, supra note 30, at 2.  
 69. The name “action painters” was coined by art critic Harold Rosenberg, who described the 
painter’s canvas as an arena and the act of painting a transcendent, physical drama.  See Harold 
Rosenberg, The American Action Painters, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1952, at 22, 48 (“The American vanguard 
painter took to the white expanse of the canvas as Melville’s Ishmael took to the sea.”). 
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existential authenticity”70 (see figures 1 and 2).  The branding was reinforced by 














Figure 1.  Jackson Pollock, Autumn Rhythm (Number 30) 



















Figure 2. Willem de Kooning, Easter Monday  







 70. Gibson, supra note 30, at 30.   
 71. See Collins, supra note 54, at 292–94 (discussing popular myth of societal antagonism and 
analyzing photograph accompanying story published by Life magazine in 1951, in which fifteen 
Abstract Expressionist artists solemnly glare at the camera with folded arms). 
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The artist who captivated the attention of the popular press most was Jackson 
Pollock, dubbed “Jack the Dripper,” for his poured paint technique72 (figure 3).  
Pollock, the emotionally-tortured, hard-drinking artist from Cody, Wyoming, has 
been described as the first American “artist-celebrity.”73  He was twice profiled in 
Life magazine, with stories celebrating both his self-destructive personal traits and 
his incomprehensible, enigmatic painting.74  In 1951, Pollock’s signature drip 
















Figure 3.  Photo © Martha Holmes / The LIFE Picture Collection / Getty Images 
 
Art critics—especially Greenberg—championed Abstract Expressionist painting 
as a uniquely American shake-up of the Western history of art.76  At the same time, 
Greenberg sought to overcome the “lurking provincial fate” of American art77 by 
emphasizing its European pedigree.78  Greenberg’s art theory, formalism, was now 
divested of prior social goals and focused exclusively on the self-contained, 
physical properties of the work as an end unto itself.79  Greenberg presented his 
 
 72. See Collins, supra note 54, at 289. 
 73. See Collins, supra note 54, at 298. 
 74. Gibson, supra note 30, at 2; see also Collins, supra note 54, at 289–90 (discussing Pollock’s 
media attention following Life magazine article from 1949, entitled, Jackson Pollock: Is he the greatest 
living painter in the United States?); cf. ANFAM, supra note 29, at 16 (calling Abstract Expressionists 
“the last artistic generation to internalize romantic stereotypes”). 
 75. See Thomas Crow, Fashioning the New York School, in MODERN ART IN THE COMMON 
CULTURE 39, 39–41 (1996). 
 76. See, e.g., CLEMENT GREENBERG, AMERICAN-TYPE PAINTING (1955/1958), reprinted in ART 
AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 38, at 209 (asserting that Abstract Expressionist works 
“constitute the first manifestation of American art to draw a standing protest at home as well as serious 
attention from Europe”); Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 23 (repeatedly referring to Abstract 
Expressionism as “American” painting). 
 77. GREENBERG, supra note 76, at 228 (observing that until now, “[t]his country had not yet 
made a single contribution to the mainstream of painting or sculpture”). 
 78. See GREENBERG, supra note 76, at 211 (championing the Abstract Expressionists while 
noting that “every one of them started from French art”). 
 79. See Thomas Crow, The Practice of Art History in America, 135 DAEDALUS 70, 79 (2006) 
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discriminating eye as an objective account of artistic quality, discernable by the 
object’s visual properties, alone.80  Although claiming not to favor a particular 
style, Greenberg persistently viewed realism as inferior, disqualifying American 
social realist painters like Ben Shahn from the ranks of greatness alongside Stalin’s 
artistic henchmen.81 
In Greenberg’s quasi-Kantian theory of visual development, artists steadily 
rejected representational illusion for a purer, self-referential idiom.82  The Museum 
of Modern Art echoed this logic in Barr’s exhibition layout:  European modernism 
unfolded as a genealogical progression of increasingly abstract form, moving from 
Impressionism, to Cubism, and ultimately, to Abstract Expressionism.83  
Greenberg’s devotion to the purity of painting and its attendant imperative of 
increasing abstraction could not accommodate Cubism’s contemporaries like 
Surrealism, which depicted the subconscious through naturalistic form and pictorial 
illusion (despite its interplay with Abstract Expressionist themes).  Nor could it 
house the conceptual antics of artist Marcel Duchamp, who later configured his 
aesthetics in opposition to the physicality of painting.  As Duchamp would explain, 
“I was interested in ideas—not merely in visual products.”84 
Liberal intellectuals viewed Abstract Expressionism as contrary to American 
materialism and mass culture, and thus deeply moral and humanistic. The 
influential art historian Meyer Schapiro said at the time, “[p]ainting and sculptures, 
let us observe, are the last hand-made personal objects within our culture.”85  Yet, 
as suggested, the Abstract Expressionists enacted mainstream values and 
participated in popular culture.86  Their apparent rejection of society paradoxically 
 
(“The new power of American abstract painting in the postwar period seemed to confirm criteria of 
value that required no justification outside the formal character of any individual work . . . .”). 
 80. See CLEMENT GREENBERG, ABSTRACT, REPRESENTATIONAL, AND SO FORTH (1954), 
reprinted in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 38, at 133 (“Art is a matter strictly of 
experience, not of principles, and what counts first and last is quality; all other things are secondary.”).   
 81. See id. at 135 (asserting that “representational painting and sculpture have rarely achieved 
more than minor quality in recent years, [while] major quality gravitates more and more toward the 
nonrepresentational”); GREENBERG, supra note 76, at 229 (“At the Biennale in Venice in 1954, I saw 
how de Kooning’s exhibition put to shame not only the neighboring one of Ben Shahn [a social realist 
painter], but that of every other painter his age or under in the other pavilions.”).   
 82. Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in ARTS YEARBOOK 4 103, 103 (Hilton Kramer ed., 
1961) (identifying Kant as the source of modernism’s “self-critical tendency” and pursuit of purity).  
Modernism, in broader terms, is associated with eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers “in 
their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to 
their inner logic.” (quoting Jürgen Habermas, Modernity—an Incomplete Project, in THE ANTI-
AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 3, 9 (Hal Foster ed., 1983)). 
 83. See HAROLD ROSENBERG, THE ANXIOUS OBJECT 232 (1964) (critiquing formalism as a 
public relations approach to art, reflected in “Mr. Barr’s pamphlet, intellectually typical of this sort of art 
appreciation and scholarship, [which] educates its readers to be amateur art historians and to admire 
paintings and sculptures as contributions to the evolution of forms”). 
 84. MARCEL DUCHAMP, “PAINTING . . . AT THE SERVICE OF THE MIND” (1946), reprinted in 
HERSCHEL B. CHIPP, THEORIES OF MODERN ART 392, 394 (1968).   
 85. See Meyer Shapiro, Recent Abstract Painting (1957), reprinted in MODERN ART: 19TH AND 
20TH CENTURIES 213, 217 (1979). 
 86. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.; see also LEJA, supra note 44, at 4 (“Abstract 
Expressionism had much more in common with the mainstream culture than some of its aggressively 
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dovetailed with prevailing cultural myths.87  Despite the apparent obstruction of 
audience communication, nonrepresentational art’s elusive meaning was legible 
within a particular social structure, as intellectually challenging and “high brow,” 
where easily-accessible realism was “middle brow,” and mass culture “low 
brow.”88 
On the crest of international success, Abstract Expressionism embodied the 
ideals of freedom of expression in the United States.  As the quotation from 
President Eisenhower above reflects, modernism was America’s art, spawned by 
democracy and the ideal of individual liberty.  During this period, President 
Eisenhower implemented a dedicated program of “cultural warfare,” in which 
attributes of American culture were systematically disseminated in Western 
Europe, showcasing the fruits of capitalism against the barren landscape of 
communism.89  The government’s self-advertised policy of non-intervention, 
ironically, contradicted the paradigm it purported to represent.  The apolitical 
paintings of Abstract Expressionism became a flagship symbol of a political 
system.  Despite efforts to abstain from official sponsorship of art exhibitions 
abroad, the United States was perceived by many as having an “official style,” 
Abstract Expressionism.90 
If, as some have claimed, the government was either funding or promoting a 
particular type of art, the gleam of contrast to Soviet nationalistic art further 
tarnishes.91  The refusal to censor art had itself become a political message.  In 
 
elitist defenders would allow.”). 
 87. Gibson, supra note 30, at 30; LEJA, supra note 44, at 113–14 (suggesting that “noir-ish” 
presentation in media “was often more influential in the culture’s absorption of the New York School 
artists than was their work”).   
 88. Collins, supra note 54, at  290–91 (discussing 1949 article in Life magazine featuring 
illustration of three men, each looking at a picture:  the  intellectual elite “high-brow” stands before a 
Picasso painting, the “conservative and stable upper middle-brow” is presented studying a Grant Wood 
reproduction, and the low-brow man “enjoys calendar art”) (quoting Winthrop Sergeant, High-Brow, 
Low-Brow, Middle-Brow, LIFE, Apr. 11, 1949, at 99); PAUL DIMAGGIO, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND CULTURAL GOODS: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991), reprinted in THE 
POLITICS OF CULTURE 38, 47 (Gigi Bradford et al. eds., 2000) (explaining symbolic boundaries of post-
World War II culture as divided between fine art and mass culture).  
 89. Max Kozloff, American Painting During the Cold War, ARTFORUM, May 1973, at 43, 44 
(noting that although Abstract Expressionism was not a “conscious mouthpiece” for any agency, it lent 
itself to treatment as “benevolent propaganda”).  For general information on this “cultural battlefield,” 
especially movies, see ANDREW J. FALK, UPSTAGING THE COLD WAR: AMERICAN DISSENT AND 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, 1940–1960 178–211 (2010); see also Kenneth Osgood, Hearts and Minds: The 
Unconventional Cold War, 4 J. COLD WAR STUD. 85 (2002) (review essay); Thomas W. Braden, I’m 
Glad the CIA is Immoral, SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 20, 1967, at 10 (referring to Cold War as a 
war fought with ideas). 
 90. See DANTO, supra note 54, at 127.  Between 1954 and 1962, the U.S. pavilion at the Venice 
Biennale was owned by The Museum of Modern Art, the only privately owned pavilion.  At a 1954 
international exhibition of modern art held in Mexico City, all 39 countries officially sponsored their 
respective exhibits of “avant-garde” art, with the exception of the United States, which was sponsored 
by The Museum of Modern Art.  See Aline B. Louchheim, Cultural Diplomacy: An Art We Neglect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1954, at SM16 (asserting that lack of official presence reinforced view of Americans 
as “cultural barbarians interested only in dollars and materialism”).   
 91. For the leading proponents of the theory that Abstract Expressionism was “promoted” by the 
U.S. government, see SERGE GUILBAULT, HOW NEW YORK STOLE THE IDEA OF MODERN ART (Arthur 
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response to charges of communist affiliations among artists selected for a Moscow-
bound exhibition of art in 1959, one congressman argued, “I believe that it is the 
Soviet Union which has lost face by attempting political censorship of its artists.  
We do not want to get ourselves into that situation.”92  Nonrepresentational art 
dovetailed with this schema:  it said nothing and told a great story about 
democracy. 
Historically, the Abstract Expressionists were credited with overthrowing Paris 
and moving modernism’s command center to New York.93  Clement Greenberg’s 
formalist theory would account for that success by objectively-measurable 
advances in artistic quality.  However, many critics have observed, with broader 
acknowledgment of cultural influences, that the rhetoric of individualism and 
freedom accompanying Abstract Expressionism paralleled that of the United States 
government during a period of unprecedented economic success and global 
power.94 
In the words of art historian Michael Leja, Abstract Expressionism achieved 
recognition as “the quintessential artistic embodiment of the qualities and ideals 
that the nation’s mainstream, middle-class culture holds dearest:  individual 
freedom, boldness, ingenuity, grand ambition, expansiveness, confidence, 
power.”95  Jackson Pollock’s career (including his sensational death in 1956, in an 
automobile accident), offered “rich and convincing substantiation to some of the 
myths of the artist most deeply cherished [in] U.S. culture.”96 
II.  POSTMODERN IDEAS, MESSAGES, AND POLITICS 
“The Modernist artist’s isolation from sociopolitical practice has been framed and 
 
Goldhammer trans., 1983); Eva Cockcroft, Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War, 
ARTFORUM, June 1974, at 39.  For statements that the U.S. government used covert funding mechanisms 
for cultural endeavors abroad, see Braden, supra note 89 (defending CIA strategy of making undercover 
payments to cultural organizations and tours, including the Boston Symphony Orchestra performing in 
Paris and even an English magazine, Encounter, “dedicated to the proposition that cultural achievement 
and political freedom were independent”).  One organization frequently implicated in discussions about 
government cooperation with cultural organizations in the 1950s is The International Council of the 
Museum of Modern Art, where the author worked in the early 1990s. 
 92. 105 CONG. REC. 9814 (1959) (statement of Sen. Hart); cf. Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, 
and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 788 (1998) (noting that political 
behavior has high symbolic content). 
 93. See, e.g., Kozloff, supra note 89, at 44 (noting that the United States had previously “exerted 
no earlier genuine leadership . . . in visual art”); ROBERT ROSENBLUM, American Painting Since the 
Second World War, in ON MODERN AMERICAN ART 62, 62 (1999) (“[I]t could well be contended that 
not since the invention of Cubism in Paris has Western painting undergone such fundamental 
reorientations as it has in the hands of some half-dozen Americans working recently in New York.”). 
 94. Kozloff, supra note 89, at 44 (“The most concerted accomplishments of American art 
occurred during precisely the same period as the burgeoning claims of American world hegemony.”); 
LEJA, supra note 44, at 5 (describing abstract expressionism as “a high-cultural correlate of the 
country’s military, economic, and technological rise to preeminence in the Western Hemisphere during 
and after World War II”). 
 95. LEJA, supra note 44, at 5. 
 96. LEJA, supra note 44, at 202. 
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legitimized in such ideological concepts as aesthetic autonomy and formalism.”97  
– Benjamin H.D. Buchloch 
By the end of the 1960s, the proliferation of abstract painting and the 
hermetically self-referential, apolitical mandate of formalism defined the era of 
high modernism.98  Artists and art critics had already begun dismantling modernist 
tenets,99 but the hegemony of high modernism spirited a more concerted, multi-
layered rebellion. Because fragmentation was a prominent feature of 
postmodernism, this section selects from a multitude of postmodern themes, critical 
strategies, and artists. 
On an aesthetic level, Greenberg’s teleology of increasing abstraction toward 
“flatness” had a self-contained endpoint:  the surface of the canvas as such.100  
More broadly, modernism symbolized the end of the line for the entire Western 
project of art as representation and the demise of its authoritative logic.101  
Postmodern critics like Douglas Crimp viewed museums as complicit in modernist 
aesthetic theory by institutionalizing a particular cultural order built upon the 
fetishized high art object.102 
Reversing the internalized, existential crises reflected in Abstract 
Expressionism’s indecipherable iconography, postmodern artists depicted banal 
objects of American consumption—things familiar to everyone.  Most famously, 
Andy Warhol silk-screened Campbell’s soup cans and replicated Brillo boxes 
virtually indistinguishable from those on supermarket shelves (see figure 7).  Media 
previously associated with “low culture” entertainment, like photography, video, 
and performance art, competed for the primacy and intellectual stature of 
painting.103 
Further challenging the centrality of the unique art object, conceptual art 
established a stronghold in the 1960s, critiquing the former’s status as property.  In 
the artistic community, Marcel Duchamp’s idea-based aesthetics replaced the 
celebrated giants of abstract painting, like Pablo Picasso, as the key site of 
influence.  As described by postmodern critic Benjamin Buchloh:  “[b]ecause the 
 
 97. BENJAMIN H.D. BUCHLOH, PARODY AND APPROPRIATION IN FRANCIS PICABIA, POP AND 
SIGMAR POLKE (1982), reprinted in APPROPRIATION: DOCUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY ART 178 (David 
Evans ed., 2009). 
 98. See SANDLER, supra note 32, at 1 (criticizing “formalist writers on art, whose point of view 
came to dominate art criticism during the 1960’s”). 
 99. Artist Robert Rauschenberg, for example, responded to Willem de Kooning’s behemoth status 
by erasing one of de Kooning’s works and exhibiting it as his own, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953. 
 100. Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra 
note 82, at 112 (discussing view of formal innovation as no longer possible, leaving only the possibility 
of imitating dead styles of the past).  
 101. Jameson, supra note 100, at 115.  
 102. Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, OCTOBER 41, 50 (Summer 1980) (arguing that 
postmodern practices challenged the museum’s claims to represent art coherently). 
 103. See Douglas Crimp, Appropriating Appropriation, in APPROPRIATION 191 (David Evans ed., 
2009) (discussing centrality of photography to postmodernism); cf. Rosalind Krauss, Video: The 
Aesthetics of Narcissism, OCTOBER 50 (Spring 1976) (discussing video work of Vito Acconci, Bruce 
Nauman, and Lynda Benglis). 
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proposal inherent in Conceptual Art was to replace the object of spatial and 
perceptual experience by linguistic definition alone (the work as analytic 
proposition), it thus constituted the most consequential assault on the status of that 
object:  its visuality, its commodity status, and its form of distribution.”104 
Postmodernists also challenged the formalist mantra of art for art’s sake and its 
pretense of universal aesthetic standards, often directly engaging in current social 
and political issues.105  James Rosenquist incorporated wartime imagery in his “F-
111” installation,106 while Jasper Johns embarked on his now-signature flag 
paintings.  Hans Haacke challenged and exposed existing social systems, including 
an exhibit consisting of maps of Manhattan detailing the real estate holdings and 
illegal activities of their owners; the exhibition was cancelled by the Guggenheim 
Museum, New York.107 
Painting continued, but it no longer possessed moral or aesthetic superiority, and 
no particular style or school approached the monolithic dominance of Abstract 
Expressionism.  The latter became historicized in the canon, a point of commentary 
and quotation.  Among notable examples, Roy Lichtenstein offered cartoon-like 
renditions of exalted, emotionally-charged brushstrokes that evoked de Kooning’s 
painterly style (figure 4), and Mark Tansey created the mock-allegorical painting, 
“The Triumph of the New York School,” 1984.108  Tansey’s painting features a 
military surrender in which the losing army wears French military uniforms, and 
the victors, American World War II khakis.  Clement Greenberg is the commander, 
flanked by Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning, among others, while Andre 
Breton, a leader of the French surrealist school, accepts defeat.  The deliberately 
dated, illustrative style of Tansey’s painting, philosopher Arthur C. Danto said, 
reflected the deeply pluralistic nature of art since the 1970s.109  Jackson Pollock as 
“action painter” (figure 3) was redone in Bosco syrup, in a photograph by artist Vik 
Muniz (figure 5).110 
 
 104. Benjamin Buchloh, Conceptual Art 1962–1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the 
Critique of Institutions, OCTOBER 105, 107 (Winter 1990).  
 105. THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra note 82, at xv. 
 106. WOOD, supra note 33, at 114–15. 
 107. See WOOD, supra note 33, at 119–124.  In addition, “identity politics” came to the fore, with 
artists addressing gender, race, and multiculturalism—issues that lay dormant in 1950s culture.  Deeper 
discussion of these important topics is beyond the scope of this Article.   
 108. Even Norman Rockwell offered visual commentary in The Connoisseur, 1961, the featured 
cover illustration for The Saturday Evening Post dated January 13, 1962.  See NORMAN ROCKWELL 
MUSEUM, http://www.nrm.org/thinglink/text/Connoisseur.html [http://perma.cc/2D9D-DZ45] (noting 
that Rockwell constructed the abstract painting featured in his own painting by emulating Jackson 
Pollock’s process).   
 109. See Arthur C. Danto, Flag-Waving at the Whitney, THE NATION, Nov. 29, 1999, at 47 
(describing the Tansey painting and observing that “from the seventies on, American art became more 
and more deeply pluralistic, to the point that artists were no longer constrained to work in any given 
style”); see also Howard N. Fox, The Right to be Wrong, in COLLECTING THE NEW 15, 24 (Bruce 
Altshuler ed., 2005) (noting the absence of any single “school of thought” that dominates a core group 
of artists, like Abstract Expressionism). 
 110. My knowledge of this image and Michael Mandiberg’s piece, infra note 118, owes to 
Alexandra Perloff-Giles’s panel presentation, Prince v. Cariou: Towards a Jurisprudence of the Digital 
Age, at the 2015 Association for the Study of Law, Culture and Humanities Annual Conference. 
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Figure 4.  Roy Lichtenstein, Little big painting (1965), Whitney Museum of American Art  
















Figure 5.  Recreation of photograph of Jackson Pollock in Bosco syrup. 
Art © Vik Muniz / Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY. 
 
For postmodernists, authenticity and original authorship became sites of critique 
rather than veneration.111  Sherrie Levine, for example, re-photographed 
photographs by Walker Evans from an exhibition catalog and exhibited them, 
unchanged, as her own in 1979.  Jeff Koons entered the art scene in 1989 with his 
“Banality” exhibit, a show featuring larger-than-life sculptures based on “kitschy” 
Hummel figurines.  Another emergent postmodernist, Richard Prince, re-
photographed advertisements (see figure 6).  Today, following mainstream success, 
Koons and Prince continue to appropriate images, but, inevitably, with less 
 
 111. John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1237, 1255 (2012) (noting that Dada and Surrealist artists “rejected notions of originality 
and authorial genius and challenged the rights of exclusion that might go with such constructs”).  
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transgressive associations112—and a spate of copyright litigation.113  Prince’s recent 
gallery exhibition, comprised of thirty-eight Instagrams pulled from the internet, is 
















Figure 6.  Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), 1989 (Chromogenic print) 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, © Richard Prince 
 
Danto suggests that artists winning the “freedom to do anything” also marked 
the end of art, at least from a philosophical vantage.117 Today, artists have not 
ceased creating, often self-consciously addressing art commerce (including law), 
art history, and all aspects of society, politics, and culture.  In the internet era, 
images are easily replicated, re-used, transformed, and copied, and meaning is 
always in flux.118  In this era of pluralism, new media, and unstable meanings, art 
 
 112. Koons is one of the biggest artist-celebrities working today.  See, e.g., Jeff Koons: A 
Retrospective, WHITNEY MUSEUM OF AMERICAN ART, http://whitney.org/Exhibitions/JeffKoons 
[http://perma.cc/ZR6S-VMZK] (last visited July 9, 2015) (describing Koons as an artist who “pioneered 
new approaches to the readymade, tested the boundaries between advanced art and mass culture, 
challenged the limits of industrial fabrication, and transformed the relationship of artists to the cult of 
celebrity and the global market”). 
 113. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006).  For a more extensive discussion of photography’s conflicted position in the context of copyright 
law, see Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 684, 
714–15 (2012), and for additional art historical background, see Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento & Lauren van 
Haaften-Schick, Cariou v. Prince: Toward A Theory of Aesthetic-Judicial Judgments, 1 TEX. A&M L. 
REV. 941 (2014). 
 114. See, e.g., Katie Sola, Artist Richard Prince Sells Instagram Photos That Aren’t His for $90K, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/27/richard-
prince-instagram_n_7452634.html [http://perma.cc/4H9E-JQ26].   
 115. Hrag Vartanian, Photographer Sends Cease and Desist Letters to Richard Prince and 
Gagosian, HYPERALLERGIC (Feb. 15, 2015), http://hyperallergic.com/183036/photographer-sends-
cease-and-desist-letters-to-richard-prince-and-gagosian/ [http://perma.cc/F2ZY-DK8N]. 
 116. See Daniel McDermon, You Can Now Buy a $90,000 Richard Prince Instagram Work or a 
$90 ‘Copy’, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2015, 6:43 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/you-
can-now-buy-a-90000-richard-prince-instagram-work-or-a-90-copy/?ref=topics&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
8W6N-68EY] (discussing offer by website owner, whose images became source material in Prince’s 
work, to sell identical copies of Prince’s work for $90). 
 117. Danto, supra note 109; see also DANTO, supra note 54, at 130 (identifying Pop as the point 
where art ended). 
 118. For one example of art reflecting its historical consciousness through reference and re-use, 
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can be anything—pushing the limits of authorship or legality,119 incorporating 
digital culture,120 confronting social issues,121 and utilizing all mediums,122 even 
painting.  But not everything is art.  It can’t be, or the category is meaningless. 
III.  MODERNISM IN THE COURT: A BREAKDOWN 
In the aftermath of World War II, Abstract Expressionism and freedom of 
expression acquired a symbolic alliance in a particular socio-political context—
paradoxically contingent upon the former’s apolitical status.123  While deeply 
entangled with the idea of free expression, abstract art did not occasion either direct 
holding or explicit recognition as speech by the Supreme Court.124  That occurred 
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, in 1995, 
when Jackson Pollock’s painting was deemed “unquestionably shielded” by the 
First Amendment.125 
Although a time gap between culture and law hardly seems remarkable, neither 
is it sufficient, by itself, to explain the Hurley Court’s remark and its implications.  
If we apply Frederick Schauer’s descriptive, historically-situated account of the 
scope of speech,126 Jackson Pollock’s painting did not simply surface in First 
Amendment doctrine in the 1990s, with its 1950s meanings intact, but was 
rendered salient by contemporaneous social influences as a symbol, at a particular 
site of contested interests.  In short, the Hurley case was itself a context and a 
cultural participant—in a culture that was not modernism. 
This Part offers doctrinal background related to artistic expression 
chronologically, beginning with the modernist era described in Part I.  It then 
unpacks the Hurley decision as a cultural intersection, whereby the iconic art of 
 
see Michael Mandiberg’s AFTERSHERRIELEVINE.COM, http://www.aftersherrielevine.com/ [http://
perma.cc/UR8F-J9UX] (last visited Aug. 4, 2015). 
 119. See Kyle Vanhemert, This Open Source Graffiti Drone Will Give Cops Nightmares, WIRED 
(Apr. 16, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/a-nightmare-for-cops-a-drone-that-paints-
graffiti/?mbid=social_twitter#slide-id-720331 [http://perma.cc/UR8F-J9UX] (discussing graffiti artist 
Katsu, who has used a spray-paint-wielding drone to execute his work). 
 120. See supra notes 113 and 117. 
 121. See Julia Michalska, African-American artists respond to racial injustice in the US, ART 
NEWSPAPER (June 18, 2015), http://theartnewspaper.com/reports/157020/ [http://perma.cc/AP5C-
BM78] (discussing greater presence of works addressing race relations at international art fair Art 
Basel). 
 122. Artist Janine Antoni, for example, has created sculpture that includes a piece described as 600 
lbs. of lard, gnawed by the artist.  See BROOKLYN MUSEUM, http://www.brooklynmuseum.org/eascfa/
feminist_art_base/gallery/janineantoni.php?i=642 [https://perma.cc/3DPT-8LF2] (last visited July 9, 
2015). 
 123. See supra Part I. 
 124. Abstract art was arguably rendered copyrightable expression at the time.  See Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (referring to copyrightable expression “by modernistic form or color”).  If so, 
it would not be amenable to speech protection as an idea, pursuant to the “idea-expression dichotomy,” a 
distinction reflected in the language of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and that remains unresolved for abstract art.  
See Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1570–71 (1984) 
(“The idea-expression dichotomy proves more difficult to apply to non-representational art.”).   
 125. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 126. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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modernism acquired the Constitution’s protective shelter in the midst of 
postmodern art’s political maelstrom.  Finally, it introduces modernism’s misplaced 
sovereignty in contemporary First Amendment law, as a set of ossified aesthetic 
values employed to govern an incongruous artistic environment. 
A.  THE ARTISTIC EXPRESSION CATEGORY: POLITICS TO FORMALISM 
“Artistic expression” was realized as an official speech category in 1952, when 
the Supreme Court pronounced motion pictures a speech medium.127  Movies, the 
Court explained, “may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, 
ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of 
thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”128  This outward expansion of 
speech aligned with the socio-political culture of communist fears that had 
infiltrated the arts.129  The opinion, however, also emphasizes the film’s narrative 
features.130 
Popular entertainment magazines had acquired speech status a few years earlier, 
with overt references to the politics of arts regulation.  The Supreme Court, for 
example, found a constitutional violation in the postmaster’s revocation of a 
postage subsidy to Esquire magazine, on grounds of poor taste.131  Justice Douglas 
asserted, “a requirement that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by 
an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system.”132  In Winters v. New 
York, the Court held that the First Amendment embraced violent crime stories, 
warranting the same constitutional protection as “the best of literature.”133  
“Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction,” the Court 
 
 127. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to motion pictures as 
a “significant medium for the communication of ideas”).  Notably, the category was created in the 
uniquely disfavored context of a prior restraint on speech.  See id. at 502 (“If there be capacity for evil it 
may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize 
substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here.”); see also RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 251 (2009) (suggesting that the disfavored prior restraint context somewhat 
diminishes the case’s significance for “artistic expression”). 
 128. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501. 
 129. The screening of Roberto Rossellini’s film, The Miracle (the expression at stake in the 
Burstyn case), had been picketed by protestors carrying signs like, “Don’t be a Communist—all the 
Communists are inside.”  See Marjorie Heins, The Miracle: Film Censorship and the Entanglement of 
Church and State, FREE EXPRESSION POLICY PROJECT, http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/
themiracle.html#twentythree [http://perma.cc/22ZG-CCBN]. 
 130. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502 (holding that expressive value of motion pictures was not 
undermined by the entertainment purpose, as in fiction, or by the profit motive of distributors, just like 
“books, newspapers, and magazines”).  The Court effectively overruled Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), a case involving silent film, stating, “[i]t is not without 
significance that talking pictures were first produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision.”  
Id. at 502 n.12.  
 131. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148–49 (1946).  The Court was not concerned about 
Congress instituting standards of taste, but found that the postmaster had exceeded his statutory 
authority.  Id. at 157–58. 
 132. Id. at 158. 
 133. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).  
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stated.134 
Visual art’s constitutional parentage occurred a generation later, through 
obscenity law.  In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, 
establishing “serious” artistic value as an exception to obscene speech otherwise 
excluded from First Amendment protection.135  As Amy Adler has convincingly 
argued, the “serious” artistic expression exception reflects the art historical 
environment of the early 1970s, the tail end of high modernism.136  Formalism 
dominated the popular understanding of art, while the term “serious” invoked 
modernist ideals of sincerity, originality, and authenticity.137 
Echoes of Clement Greenberg’s formalist aesthetic theory had materialized in a 
predecessor obscenity case, in Justice Stewart’s self-fashioned obscenity test:  “I 
know it when I see it . . . .”138  The Miller opinion channels this spirit by inviting 
classification of artistic value through the subject’s autonomous visual qualities,139 
pinning the choice as between art for art’s sake or “hard-core sexual conduct for its 
own sake.”140  According to Randall Bezanson, the Miller test “abruptly short-
circuited the interpretive process,”141 while another scholar notes its Kantian 
“preoccupation with the essence of challenged material.”142 
As discussed, formalist aesthetic theory measured quality exclusively by the 
self-referential, surface properties of the art object.143  Applying the obscenity test, 
Christine Haight Farley has observed, “forces courts to evaluate works for their 
artistic qualities.”144  If so, lurking in the background of obscenity law is an affront 
to a fundamental tenet of First Amendment reasoning:  excluding consideration of 
 
 134. Id. (“The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a 
free press].”). 
 135. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).  Notably, images were still viewed as holding a 
second-tier status to words.  See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) (stating that words have 
a “different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values”); Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st 
Cir. 1970) (finding precedent involving verbal communications unavailing to protect plaintiff’s 
paintings of nudes because oral speech and text were “entitled to greater protection”). 
 136. See Amy M. Adler, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 
1364 (1990).  
 137. Id. at 1366; see also Haight Farley, supra note 19, at 848 (discussing same). 
 138. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 139. Haight Farley, supra note 19, at 847 (“Any case in which a court must resolve whether an 
object is art or obscenity necessarily employs the aesthetic theory of formalism.”). 
 140. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973).  In the language of Miller, political value is a 
separate category from artistic value.  See id. at 24.   
 141. Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 275, 292 (1998) (arguing that the Miller test permits “all elements but the audience and the 
community and cultural forces working on it to be cut out of the assignment of meaning”). 
 142. Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations From Obscenity, 
Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 323–24 (1999).  In a companion case decided the 
same day as Miller, the Court echoes this essentialist presumption by dismissing the need for experts.  
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (asserting that “[t]he films, obviously, are the 
best evidence of what they represent”).  Years later, in the only case placing a museum director on trial 
for obscenity, an Ohio court rejected the relevance of context in assessing whether Robert 
Mapplethorpe’s photographs were obscene under Miller, because “the pictures speak for themselves.”  
See City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1990). 
 143. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 144. Haight Farley, supra note 19, at 831.   
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artistic quality.145 
Notably, nonrepresentational art appears in academic commentary in the early 
1970s as well, described by Melvin Nimmer as noncognitive, yet “unquestionably 
within the First Amendment’s scope.”146  Years later, in 1990, nonrepresentational 
art became a benchmark of aesthetic value in a concurring opinion authored by 
Judge Posner, explaining the expressive value of nude dancers at the Kitty Kat 
Lounge in South Bend, Indiana.147  Pronouncing the show devoid of ideas, Judge 
Posner likened its cognitive emptiness to Titian’s “Venus with a Mirror,” a painting 
that, he stated, nonetheless “expresses,” in the same manner as nonrepresentational 
painting: 
There is pattern, design, harmony, and color in abstract painting, and these attributes 
evoke pleasure and other emotions in an appreciative viewer.  But there is no story, no 
articulable idea, no verbal meaning.  The notion that all art worthy of the name has a 
“message” is philistine, and leads to the weird conclusion that nonrepresentational art 
and nonprogrammatic, non-vocal music are entitled to less protection under the First 
Amendment than striptease dancing because the latter has a more distinct, articulable 
message.148 
For Judge Posner, the expectation of narrative is, as Clement Greenberg would 
certainly have agreed, “philistine.”149  At the same time, Judge Posner extinguishes 
Greenberg’s high and low culture dichotomy by extending equal value to a 
striptease, as speech (the striptease appears to have greater value as a message).  By 
funneling high modernist art theory through First Amendment egalitarianism, 
Judge Posner both enforces and undoes formalism’s defining principles. 
B.  JACKSON POLLOCK’S PAINTING AS SPEECH, 1995 
The Supreme Court affirmatively endorsed Jackson Pollock’s painting as speech 
 
 145. See Bezanson, supra note 141, at 277 (“It is axiomatic that the quality of speech—its 
goodness or badness from a literary, artistic, or aesthetic perspective, or its effectiveness in 
communicating to an audience—should bear no relationship to its protection under the First 
Amendment.”); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4 (2011) (“Crudely 
violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech 
than The Divine Comedy.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) 
(“[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make 
principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the 
individual.”). 
 146. Nimmer, supra note 15, at 35. 
 147. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), 
rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (concluding that barroom 
dancing was protected expression, but “only marginally so”).   
 148. Id.   
 149.  See id.  Posner’s assertion that late Renaissance mythological painting is devoid of narrative 
content seems questionable, but in keeping with the modernist purview he expresses elsewhere.  See 
Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (describing artist’s 
stained glass windows as racially offensive and sexually explicit while pronouncing them “art for art’s 
sake” and not politically-motivated). 
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in 1995,150 outside the legal domain of obscenity law and the high modernist era 
surrounding the Miller decision.151  Rather, high modernism’s artistic values—
originality, the high vs. low cultural binary, and sincerity—were under assault by 
postmodern art.152  Further widening this chasm was art’s “turn toward the 
political,” sparking controversy on the frontlines of the 1990s Culture Wars.153  The 
Hurley case unfolded in the wake of the Corcoran Gallery of Art’s decision to 
cancel an exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic photographs, among 
other censorship disputes prompted by art that challenged entrenched social 
norms.154 
Political speech may stand as the premiere target of First Amendment 
protection, but not when a connection to the National Endowment for the Arts (the 
“NEA”) can be identified.  Only a few years after the Hurley decision, the Court 
decided National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, upholding a statutory provision 
enabling the NEA to consider “general standards of decency and respect for the 
diverse beliefs and values of the American public” as factors in awarding grants.155  
The Supreme Court’s enshrinement of apolitical nonrepresentational art as speech, 
in this context, missed the point entirely.  In effect, the First Amendment’s alliance 
with Abstract Expressionist art was indoctrinated at its point of rupture with 
politically charged postmodern art. 
Although visual art was not the subject of the Hurley case, the cultural 
juxtaposition of Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic photographs against 
nonrepresentational art by modernism’s rugged, American hero, Jackson Pollock, is 
relevant because the Hurley case was a Culture Wars case.  The Court analyzed 
whether the Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade was private speech belonging to its 
sponsor, a Veterans’ group; if so, the sponsor had a First Amendment right to 
exclude an Irish LGBT organization from participating in the march under a self-
identifying banner.156  The Court offered a litany of “symbolic speech” precedent 
 
 150. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 151. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.   
 152. Adler, supra note 136, at 1365–69.   
 153. See Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic 
Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1996) (referring to political art as “intricately bound up with 
the ‘culture wars’ of the past seven years, both responding to and provoking an escalating series of right-
wing attacks on artistic expression”). 
 154. The Mapplethorpe exhibition, “The Perfect Moment,” was canceled by the Corcoran Gallery 
of Art in Washington D.C., before its scheduled opening in 1989 (the show had been previously 
exhibited in Philadelphia and Chicago without complaint).  At a subsequent venue, the Contemporary 
Arts Center in Cincinnati, Ohio, the museum and its director, Dennis Barrie, were indicted under a state 
obscenity law.  The trial court was instructed to apply the obscenity test established under Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to each of the selected Mapplethorpe photographs, rather than viewing 
the exhibition as a whole.  See City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ohio 
Misc. 2d 1990).  Barrie and the museum were acquitted by an Ohio jury.  See Isabel Wilkerson, 
Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1.  The 
sexually explicit work of multi-media artist David Wojnarowicz, aimed at AIDS awareness, was 
similarly targeted in a sustained attack on NEA funding by conservative members of Congress and right-
wing organizations.  See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).   
 155. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998). 
 156. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).  
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(speech arising from nonverbal conduct, often involving the use of a symbol, like 
the flag), querying whether the parade’s lack of a “particularized message” 
precluded constitutional coverage.157  It could not, the Court reasoned, lest Jackson 
Pollock’s paintings stand unprotected.158 
As Madhavi Sunder has insightfully discussed, the Hurley opinion, steeped in a 
romantic rhetoric of individual autonomy, enshrined a propertized view of 
speech.159  By recognizing the parade as the sponsor’s private speech, the Court 
granted a right to exclude a voice of dissent from its discursive space, thereby 
reinforcing the cultural status quo.160  Pollock’s work may not have been 
dispositive of the holding,161 but it was aligned with the sponsor’s declared interest 
in protecting family values—mainstream convention dressed in the rights of artistic 
expression.162 
Notably, the Hurley Court’s approach to assessing the expressive value of the 
parade departed from symbolic speech precedent, which had manifestly utilized 
context to divine the presence of a communicated message, e.g., flag desecration 
aimed at high-profile political events.163  Instead of considering social context as a 
 
The case was approached as compelled speech.  In the Court’s analysis, if the parade was sufficiently 
expressive, it constituted private speech owned by the sponsor.  And if the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston (employing the acronym “GLIB”) was expressing an inconsistent 
message by marching under a banner identifying the group’s name, the sponsor could not be compelled 
to publish that message.  Id. at 561.  The Court noted that although the Veterans’ group had been “rather 
lenient in admitting participants” over the years, this did not forfeit speech protection.  Id. at 569.  The 
sponsor was thus found exempt from complying with a public accommodations law that prevented 
discrimination on the basis of sex.  Id. at 570.  
 157. Id. at 569 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (First 
Amendment shields refusal to salute flag); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 
(marching with Nazi swastika); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(protecting wearing armbands to protest Vietnam war); Stromberg v. California, 51 S. Ct. 532 (1931) 
(display of Communist flag)).   
 158. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (reversing 
defendant’s conviction for upside-down flag display with peace sign affixed, given defendant’s intent to 
convey a “particularized message”)).  
 159. Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual 
Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 145 (1996) (discussing the “dual tendency within the First Amendment toward a 
formalistic, reified (or propertized) view of speech and toward a romantic view of speaker autonomy”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 204 (asserting that if Pollock’s work was not protected, the 
argument in Hurley about the parade’s expressiveness would require reconstruction). 
 162. See Sunder, supra note 159, at 153–56 (critiquing the Hurley Court’s formalistic application 
of autonomy theory); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
1409–10 (1986) (arguing that the Kantian idea of intrinsic value is reflected in the over-valuation of 
autonomy as an end goal in free speech jurisprudence).  
 163. In Spence v. Washington, the case which the Hurley Court was quoted as requiring a 
“particularized message”, the Court found that the speaker’s intent was communicated given the great 
likelihood an audience would understand the altered flag as a protest of the concurrent Cambodian 
incursion and Kent State killings of students.  418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (finding that “the nature of 
appellant’s activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken,” 
rendered his conduct a form of protected expression); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 
(1989) (finding speech because the “expressive, overtly political nature of [burning a flag] was both 
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,” performed during the Republican National Convention in 
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source of meaning,164 the Hurley opinion offers a florid description of the social 
role of parades in nineteenth-century Philadelphia.165  Using this displaced 
aesthetic metric,166 Justice Souter, speaking for a unanimous Court, concludes that 
the “inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point” is sufficient for 
constitutional status.167  The would-be marchers were thus excluded from a canvas 
stretching over Boston’s public sidewalks. 
C.  EX POST HURLEY: DISORDER IN THE MARKETPLACE 
Following the Hurley opinion, Jackson Pollock’s painting has become a legal 
principle, cited when courts must determine whether a given instance of 
expression—typically nonverbal—constitutes speech.  While legal literature 
addressing the scope of speech often focuses on over- or under-inclusion,168 I 
concentrate on the doctrinal disorder arising from this narrow site of cultural 
misalignment.  Jackson Pollock’s painting operates like a broken compass, steering 
courts in an endless loop of anachronistic assumptions that make no sense in a 
postmodern landscape. 
That modernism has any effect on contemporary speech boundaries is not an 
obvious proposition.  Indeed, postmodernism’s dissolution of modernism’s rigid 
hierarchies arguably serves the First Amendment’s egalitarian purposes better than 
the elite connotations of Jackson Pollock’s paintings.  Recent Supreme Court 
decisions are not merely welcoming of visual media, but have situated it on the 
highest rung of speech protection, triggering strict scrutiny of any form of 
government regulation.169 
Any image, it seems, is speech under the absolutist rhetoric deployed in United 
 
Dallas). 
 164. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 (reasoning that the speaker’s conduct addressed “issues of great 
public moment” and that the same flag display “today might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre 
behavior”); see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Conduct and the Freedom of “Speech”, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1538 (1993) (observing that “[c]ontext was critical” to the Spence decision).  But see 
Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment, 
63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1471–72 (2014) (describing the Spence approach as “relatively, if not entirely, 
acontextual”); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 
(1995) (criticizing Spence test for its abstraction and disregard of social context).  
 165. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) 
(describing nineteenth century parades as “public dramas of social relations” in which “performers 
define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for communication and 
consideration”) (internal citations omitted). 
 166. See R. George Wright, What Counts As “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining the Scope 
of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1243 (2010) (describing the Hurley Court’s 
“apparent backtracking” from consideration of context). 
 167. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.  The Court added that this “inherent expressiveness” explained its 
earlier protest march cases.  Id. (citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)).  
 168. See Wright, supra note 166, at 1242 (“But if we define speech either too narrowly or too 
broadly, in light of our basic reasons for protecting speech in the first place, we again risk either 
repression on the one hand, or dilution and trivialization on the other.”).   
 169. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny to 
legislation restricting sale or rental of violent video games to minors). 
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States v. Stevens, which invalidated a statute aimed at restricting the commercial 
trade in animal crush videos.170  Unless falling within an established categorical 
proscription,171 the Court states, all speech has full protection, regardless of social 
or artistic value.172  Other decisions have also emphasized that the romantic notion 
of individual authorship is dispensable; media corporations are entitled to the same 
rights of expressive autonomy.173  And, consistent with First Amendment tradition, 
original content is not required for protection.174 
However, the edges of speech are blurrier than the rhetoric suggests; as Justice 
Scalia reminds us, “the Amendment has no application when what is restricted is 
not protected speech.”175  In this light, the Stevens decision becomes less boundless.  
The Court invalidated a statute criminalizing the commercial trade in visual and 
auditory “depictions of animal cruelty,”176 but its reasoning focused less on 
whether the dogfight videos at issue constituted speech177 than on the repugnant 
proposition of designating a new class of categorically unprotected speech.178  The 
Court found the statute facially overbroad, meaning unconstitutional for all the 
speech it might include.179  Implicitly, then, images that are “not protected speech” 
are still subject to regulation, and the criteria for speech status remain unknown. 
Further complicating the status of visual art, speech subcategories often 
establish the level of constitutional protection afforded.180  In particular, 
commercial speech, wholly unprotected in the mid-twentieth century, is now 
entitled to protection of a “lesser” degree than noncommercial speech.181  The 
question of what constitutes speech and how to categorize it thus remains vital in a 
 
 170. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
 171. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (referring to “certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” that are not within the scope of the First Amendment). 
 172. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (finding the idea of balancing the value of protecting animal cruelty 
videos against its societal costs “startling and dangerous”); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional 
Freedom: The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 428 
(2013) (describing speech protection under Stevens as “a virtually impossible bar for the government to 
overcome”).  
 173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010); see also Jim Chen, Conduit-Based 
Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1419 (2005) (“In media markets, speakers deviate 
substantially from the romantic.”). 
 174. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding newspaper’s publication 
of paid advertisement was not occluded from speech protection). 
 175. Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011); see also Wright, supra 
note 166, at 1218 (“One can be a free speech absolutist, certainly, only if not everything counts as 
speech.”). 
 176. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464, 468. 
 177. Id. at 481–82 (“We therefore need not and do not decide whether a statute limited to crush 
videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional.”). 
 178. Id. at 472. 
 179. Id. at 483 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case should have been vacated and remanded 
for the lower court to decide whether the videos sold by the defendant were constitutionally protected). 
 180. Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional 
Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 918–19 (2009) (observing that despite proscription on content-based distinctions, 
“some message types are treated with reverence while others are treated as suspiciously profane”).   
 181. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); see 
also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) 
(finding protection of commercial speech “less extensive than that afforded ‘noncommercial speech’”). 
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regime of absolutism. 
There is nothing new about the challenges of speech classification at the 
margins, as the commercial speech doctrine has demonstrated.182  Yet artistic 
expression precedent is more helpful to some types of media than others.  Motion 
pictures, as discussed, arrived with venerable Constitutional grounding:  words and 
presumptive politics.183  This hardware resurfaces in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, where the Court unqualifiedly embraces video games, 
noting their use of “familiar literary devices,”184 a feature that catapults video 
games to the ranks of The Divine Comedy.185  Justice Scalia, who authored the 
opinion, also imports the political presumptions of mid-century entertainment cases 
like Winters, side-stepping any need for judicial interpretation.186 
However, such connections are scarce when the subject claims protection as 
visual art—already a non grata topic in judicial reasoning.  First, nonverbal 
expression has a less fortunate lineage as speech, with the Court considerably more 
attentive to the need for boundaries by requiring indicia of communication.187  At 
the same time, art’s doctrinal presence rests largely on the formalistic predicate of 
not being obscene, despite its inescapable associations of aesthetic quality.188  
Added to this mix is the Hurley decision, instructing that nonverbal, 
nonrepresentational art does not require a communicated message to receive full 
protection.189  The sum of these premises makes for a perplexing set of “boundary 
criteria” to guide courts when First Amendment protection is invoked.190 
 
 182. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (noting that although commercial speech was unquestionably 
within the First Amendment’s ambit, “the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be 
termed commercial speech” were “[m]ore subject to doubt”). 
 183. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); see also supra notes 126–129. 
 184. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (referring to “characters, dialogue, 
plot, and music”); see also Am. Amusement Mach. Assoc. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 
2001) (finding video games protected speech due to “literary” nature and story lines). 
 185. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737 n.4 (“Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and 
intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.  But these cultural and intellectual differences are 
not constitutional ones.”). 
 186. Id. at 2733 (“Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.” (quoting 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) and explaining that asking courts to distinguish 
between politics and entertainment would be “dangerous to try”)); see also supra notes 132–133 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion of distinguishing entertainment and politics in relation to the 
Brown decision, see R. George Wright, Judicial Line-Drawing and the Broader Culture: The Case of 
Politics and Entertainment, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341 (2012).   
 187. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (cautioning that “an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby 
to express an idea” (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968))).  A similar sentiment 
was later articulated with respect to recreational dancing.  See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 
(1989) (“It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—
for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is 
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 188. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (citing 
Hurley in noting that “the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a work of art is protected 
by the First Amendment even if it conveys no discernable message”).  
 190. See Post, supra note 164, at 1250 (“In order to determine which path of analysis a court 
should pursue, we must have boundary criteria for deciding when First Amendment standards shall be 
BONNEAU, EX POST MODERNISM, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 195 (2015)  
224 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
What else, courts must ascertain, belongs in a category that includes 
noncognitive, apolitical paintings by Jackson Pollock, but which cannot be tested 
by content, artistic quality, or original, individual authorship?191  The Hurley 
remark was rendered in a noncommercial context, yet Jackson Pollock’s painting 
repeatedly surfaces in commercial settings; in such cases, courts must differentiate 
an art object (speech) from a mere object (merchandise).192  And how might a court 
distinguish an advertisement, receiving less extensive First Amendment protection, 
from a re-photographed advertisement by Richard Prince?193  In the modernist era, 
a broadly recognized demarcation stood between high and low culture.  
Postmodernism’s dissolution of cultural borderlines, however, has complicated the 
judicial endeavor. 
Two cases that rely on the Hurley Court’s conclusion about Jackson Pollock’s 
painting illustrate key features of a deep misalignment.  In Kleinman v. City of San 
Marcos, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals endeavored to classify, for First 
Amendment purposes, a colorfully-painted, wrecked automobile used as a cactus 
planter, which stood outside the owner’s novelty store in public view.  While the 
owner claimed a right to artistic expression, the court disagreed, deciding that “the 
car-planter is a utilitarian device, an advertisement, and ultimately a ‘junked 
vehicle’”; the piece was thus subject to a state ordinance against the public display 
of junked vehicles.194  The court opined that the Hurley decision “refers solely to 
great works of art,”195 a conclusion in dubious compliance with the First 
Amendment’s excision of quality considerations.196 
In White v. City of Sparks, a Ninth Circuit court exempted an artist’s sale of 
original paintings of nature from the city’s prohibition of selling merchandise in 
public parks.  Citing Hurley, the court rejected the city’s argument that a message 
was required for First Amendment protection.197  Although full constitutional 
protection does not otherwise demand original authorship, the White court reasoned 
that the sale of original paintings does “more than propose a commercial 
 
brought into play.”).   
 191. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003) (protecting copies of art 
image as speech and observing that publishers disseminating the work of others receive full First 
Amendment protection). 
 192. Unlike mere merchandise, the sale of speech is fully protected under the First Amendment.  
See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines 
are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”); cf. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 92 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (deciding whether hand-painted articles of clothing constituted art). 
 193. For a discussion of an example hinging on the distinction between art and advertising, see 
Megan Carpenter, Art and(or) Outdoor Advertising in Marfa, Texas, MADISONIAN.NET (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://madisonian.net/2013/08/30/art-andor-outdoor-advertising-in-marfa-texas/ [http://perma.cc/4LSN-
T5CU] (discussing dispute as to whether neon-lit Playboy bunny sign outside Marfa, Texas was 
sculpture or advertisement). 
 194. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2010).   
 195. Id. at 326. 
 196. Cf. Bezanson, supra note 141, at 392 (arguing that judgments about quality tend to intervene 
at speech boundaries). 
 197. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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transaction.”198  But the court expressly reserved judgment as to works of art “that 
are copies of another artist’s work or paintings done in an art factory setting where 
the works are mass-produced by the artist or others.”199 
This caveat offers a striking recitation of core modernist values, whereby the 
inherent originality of painting still speaks loudly for constitutional purposes.  Yet 
much postmodern art is occluded by these standards, including Andy Warhol’s 
silkscreened prints, often produced by assistants in a studio known as the Factory 
(see figure 7), and sculptures by Jeff Koons, whose oeuvre is defined by copying, 
mass production, and, of course, copyright litigation. What would the court have 
said to appropriation artist par excellence Richard Prince, vending his 
reproductions of J.D. Salinger’s original publication of The Catcher in the Rye on 
the perimeters of Central Park (an event staged following the district court’s 
unfavorable copyright ruling in Cariou v. Prince)?200  The books were identical to 
Salinger’s first edition except for the author’s name (replaced with Richard Prince) 
and a disclaimer stating, “This is an artwork by Richard Prince.  Any similarity to a 












Figure 7.  Andy Warhol, Vegetarian Vegetable from Campbell's Soup II; © 2015 The Andy Warhol 
Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York 
IV.  MODERNISM’S LENS 
That the Supreme Court’s first specific reference to visual art’s status as speech 
emerged by way of Jackson Pollock’s nonlinguistic drip paintings makes sense.  
This was flagship artistic expression in the 1950s, triumphant alongside the First 
 
 198. Id. at 957 (“White’s paintings, which communicate his vision of the sanctity of nature, do 
more than propose a commercial transaction and therefore are not commercial speech.”).   
 199. Id. at 956 n.4. 
 200. See 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 
on Prince’s liability for copyright infringement and finding Prince’s appropriation of plaintiff’s 
copyrighted photographs was not fair use), rev’d in part, vacated in part, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 
(2013).  I thank Rebecca Tushnet for suggesting this example.   
 201. For further details about this work, see Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince’s Latest Act of 
Appropriation: The Catcher in the Rye, POETRYFOUNDATION.ORG, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/
harriet/2012/04/richard-princes-latest-act-of-appropriation-the-catcher-in-the-rye/ [http://perma.cc/
5TZG-AWDA] (last visited Sept. 4, 2015). 
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Amendment’s rise in cultural prominence.  That we recognize the intuitive 
correctness of this connection even today makes sense in light of the enduring 
authority of twentieth-century ideas and norms in shaping First Amendment 
discourse.  What makes less sense is the implicit assumption that a bare reference 
to the artifactual residue of this symbolic construct, as reified in the Hurley opinion, 
provides a meaningful lens for considering art as constitutional speech today.  
Nonrepresentational art in contemporary First Amendment law, I argue, is a 
discursive trompe l’oeil.  It appears as an expansive embrace of artistic expression, 
yet works from cramped conceptual quarters, with no view. 
A.  THEORY: APOLITICAL THINGS AND AUTONOMY 
The Hurley Court did not so much embrace Jackson Pollock’s paintings as 
speech, as deploy the cultural certainty of that conclusion.  It did so in a particular 
way, summoning the “painting of Jackson Pollock,” outside of historical context or, 
for that matter, any particular act of display or expression.202  Unmoored from the 
social context that animated its First Amendment salience, Jackson Pollock’s work 
was formally declared speech as canonized, high-value art.203  Not only was there 
no threat of censorship, but also no grounding in the most fundamental theories 
undergirding the scope of speech:  politics and ideas.204   
Nonrepresentational art’s speech status, however, remains a surprising staple of 
normative legal theory.  Robert Post avers that apolitical, noncognitive artworks 
“comfortably fit” his concept of democratic participation through public 
discourse.205  On the other hand, James Weinstein, also advancing a theory of 
participatory democracy, finds its “greatest explanatory shortcoming” in the 
Court’s robust protection of “non-ideational art.”206  Weinstein considers, but 
ultimately resists, the proposition that abstract art merits First Amendment 
protection as a form of political dissent, evidenced by suppression under totalitarian 
regimes.207  He thus recognizes its “rigorous protection” but cannot accept a 
 
 202. Cf. Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 601 (1st Cir. 2012) (asserting that “[w]hile the mural is 
itself not speech, the First Amendment protects artistic as well as political expression”). 
 203. See Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 35 (noting that the Hurley Court named “great artists,” 
whose work made sense as protected speech precisely because it was “unquestionably great and hence 
of great value”).  
 204. Schauer, supra note 17, at 1306 (“We are required to accept the view that the Constitution 
gives speech and press special protection, that in close cases we must develop an underlying theory of 
the first amendment, and that this underlying theory must be consistent with, and preferably supportive 
of, the special protection for speech given by the document.”). 
 205. See Post, supra note 12, at 486 (“Art and other forms of noncognitive, nonpolitical speech fit 
comfortably within the scope of public discourse.”).  Among the skeptical commentary, see Tushnet, 
supra note 3, at 207 (referring to Post’s theory as a “weakly sociologized account of art’s coverage”). 
 206. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 499 n.45 (finding protection of “non-ideational” art incompatible 
with theory of participatory democracy). 
 207. Id.  For proponents of this theory, see Eberle, supra note 5 (illustrating art’s subversive power 
in “regimes like Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia that considered art to have the potential to be deeply 
threatening to the social order”); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 101 (1996) 
(discussing Hitler and Stalin as evidencing the importance of protecting art as free speech).  For a 
similar justification tied to Senator Dondero, see Nahmod, supra note 5, at 256 (asserting that Senator 
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political justification, leaving nonrepresentational art as the solitary thorn in the 
side of his speech principle.208 
The confluence of nonrepresentational art and speech is obvious from the 
vantage of autonomy or self-realization as speech principle, another branch of 
Abstract Expressionism’s auspicious alliance with freedom of expression.209  Yet 
autonomy proponents likewise insist on abstract art’s apolitical, ahistorical status, 
shoring up its speech status in the romantic author paradigm.210  C. Edwin Baker 
argues that, “[t]hough artists might aim to influence public opinion about 
aesthetics, many probably want simply to produce good art—that is, the [Hurley] 
Court most likely sees itself as protecting exercises of expressive autonomy.”211  
The Court perhaps sees itself this way, but to accept this justification at face value 
overlooks the historical context in which the decision was rendered:  Jackson 
Pollock was forty years dead and his works widely revered as art objects.  Any 
expansion of the scope of speech wrought by the Hurley decision offered little to 
postmodern artists embroiled in the Finley case, for example, where the Court 
upheld government control over matters of taste in arts funding. 
B.  CONTEXT: THE MUSEUM CONFINES 
“All museums. . . are museums of modern art, to the extent that the judgment of what 
is art is based on an aesthetic of formalism.”212 –Arthur C. Danto  
Mark Tushnet has identified the many anomalies in legal reasoning induced by 
the First Amendment’s coverage of art, deliberately avoiding aesthetic theory.213  
But modernist theory is not so easily extracted, as when Tushnet asserts that 
nonrepresentational art “exists for its own sake . . . , which is why governments 
rarely try to regulate it.”214  What Tushnet makes explicit in his analysis is 
embedded in most legal commentary:  a circumscribed universe of “serious and 
 
Dondero “was correct in understanding that nonrepresentational art can and does have considerable 
influence on society’s ideas and behavior”). 
 208. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 499 n.45 (acknowledging arguments that abstract art 
constitutes a form of political dissent and concluding, “[s]till, I am not sure that these arguments 
adequately explain the rigorous protection afforded non-ideational art”). 
 209. See Blake, supra note 6, at 1082 (defending inclusion of nondiscursive visual art on grounds 
that self-development, “either through making or receiving expression, is actually an end in itself”); 
Blocher, supra note 164, at 1452 (asserting that even nonsensical or noncognitive artistic expression is 
important to “the autonomy and self-development of those speaking it”);  
 210. Baker, supra note 16, at 271 (“Abstract art and compositional music, found, for example, in 
the Court’s dicta referring to Jackson Pollock and Arnold Schoenberg’s music, require a stretch to 
justify as political speech or truth propositions to test in a marketplace of ideas.”); Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 555 (2011) (asserting that neither 
Post’s nor Weinstein’s theory of public discourse offers direct support for protecting abstract art). 
 211. C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV. 
515, 528 (2011). 
 212. DANTO, supra note 54, at 111. 
 213. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 170 n.5. 
 214. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 203.  But see Blocher, supra note 164, at 1425–26 (asserting that the 
Hurley Court “reassuringly declared” Pollock’s work to be covered speech and suggesting other artists 
and speakers of “nonsense” may have reason for concern). 
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indeed important works” from the twentieth century.215  These canonized 
boundaries—conjuring the treasures of modern museums—quell the impetus for 
government censorship because they presuppose consensus-driven cultural value 
derived from isolated art objects.  Paradoxically, and particularly with respect to 
nonrepresentational art, attaining that high art classification both reduces its 
meaning (except as an aesthetic object) and simultaneously justifies speech 
status.216 
Commentators who have urged context-driven means of identifying nonverbal 
art as speech have looked no further than traditional institutional exhibition spaces, 
i.e., that which is already implied in current discourse.  Joseph Blocher proposes 
that artistic “nonsense” can be recognized as constitutional speech when it is used 
as art (meaning that it hangs in museums and galleries).217  Blocher’s approach 
builds on that of Robert Post, who would recognize art through “social conventions 
that create constitutionally meaningful relationships,” like an art exhibition.  Post 
selects Marcel Duchamp’s “readymade” sculpture, “The Fountain” (a urinal), as his 
example, which, Post explains, became a constitutionally cognizable idea when 
submitted to the social “medium of an art exhibition” in 1917.218 
The approaches of Post and Blocher persuasively appeal to a philosophy by 
which we recognize “art” by the institutions comprising the art world.  Notably, as 
Arthur C. Danto observes in the quote above, the museum as an institution is a 
modernist idea.219  Although postmodern art likewise circulates within the art 
world, its aesthetics speak to issues outside the museum.220  In this light, it bears 
note that Post’s illustration replaces certain social conventions from 1917 with 
those of today to make its point.  Duchamp’s idea was born in a provocative taunt 
to institutionalized social conventions, from outside their space.  Although this act 
stands as a quintessential moment in the history of conceptual art, its speech status, 
by Post’s methodology, awaits reification in the “Fountain” replicas invited into 
museums years later—the original was discarded.  In effect, the museum-
sanctioned physical object (modernism’s key site of meaning), retrospectively 
creates the constitutionally cognizable idea, rather than the artist’s expressive 
act.221 
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 217. Blocher, supra note 164, at 1452. 
 218. Post, supra note 164, at 1254.   
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Museums and galleries are reliable contexts for identifying what society 
recognizes as “art,” at least in the Western tradition, and these institutions should 
possess the freedom to exhibit art of their choosing.  But as free speech 
jurisprudence in a postmodern world, institutional environs have limited utility. 
C.  UPDATE: WHAT MODERNISM DOESN’T SEE 
The First Amendment affinities that Jackson Pollock’s paintings once reflected 
have become blinders in the postmodern era.  
By assuming modernism’s insistence on originality, individual genius, and art 
for art’s sake, free speech law cannot comprehend the many iterations of 
postmodern art that challenge and subvert this hierarchy.  How postmodern art fits 
into existing First Amendment principles remains unresolved, even symbolically. 
Consider the noble adages permeating the Hurley opinion, in which “a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message,” whereas the state may 
sometimes prescribe “what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.”222  That 
distinction doesn’t easily harmonize with Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s soup cans 
(figure 7) or the former commercial artist’s claims that “everybody should be a 
machine,”223 and “somebody should be able to do all my paintings for me,” a 
prospect realized in his techniques.224 Warhol’s detached, crisp, commercial 
imagery lacks the moral high ground of Pollock’s emotionally-turbulent drip 
paintings, rendering his soup cans ill-matched to the Court’s romantic rhetoric of 
self-expression. 
Further, by training its eye exclusively on modernism’s unique, 
decontextualized object, law cannot see how postmodern means of distribution 
have altered its supremacy.  Jack Balkin contends that the entire field of First 
Amendment law has been upended by digital technology, requiring systemic 
overhaul to meet its democratic purposes.225  The circuitry of the art world is no 
less dependent on and affected by digital technology, raising issues unknown to the 
 
(2009) (“No one would question that Kasimir Malevich’s famous painting White on White would be just 
as much a protected form of expression under the First Amendment as Francisco de Goya’s realistic 
depictions of bullfights.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Freedom of Expression and the Arts, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
549, 555 (1997) (“Would we want a theory of free expression that would protect Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ or 
Soviet Realism but not Abstract Expressionism or Bach fugues?  I suspect not.”). 
 222. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) 
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985)).   
 223. Andy Warhol, quoted in G.R. SWENSON, WHAT IS POP ART? (1963), reprinted in AMERICAN 
ARTISTS ON ART 79, 86 (Ellen H. Johnson ed., 1982). 
 224.  Id. at 87.  Warhol claimed that commercial art was more emotional.  Id. 
 225. See Jack Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009) 
(arguing that free speech has become less about traditional constitutional doctrine than technological 
design, legislative and administrative regulations, business models, and participation of end-users); Jack 
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (proposing comprehensive rethinking of First Amendment rights, 
including issues of digital access and creative innovation through enhanced ability to copy, modify, 
annotate, and reconfigure expression).   
BONNEAU, EX POST MODERNISM, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 195 (2015)  
230 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
modernist era.226  As speech continues to become more propertized and driven by 
commercial interests,227 its intersection with intellectual property law has become 
more contested, introducing potential conflicts for artistic expression via copyright 
law that an isolated nonrepresentational painting cannot register.228 
In short, the conceptual dichotomies embedded in the discourse of visual art as 
speech track modernism:  pure expression vs. idea; individual authorship vs. mass 
production; noncommercial vs. commercial; high art vs. low culture.  Through this 
anachronistic paradigm, law can barely recognize, much less address, 
inconsistences and potential incursions into postmodern artistic freedom like those 
articulated in recent scholarship on the doctrines of fair use229 and the right of 
publicity.230  Accounting for postmodern practices in free speech law does not deny 
the continuing relevance of aesthetics, abstraction, museums, or art objects—much 
postmodern art participates in and relies on traditional art world institutions, 
commerce, and values.  But it does require acknowledging the limitations of 
modernism’s lens.  Rather than valorizing nonrepresentational art as the apex of 
free artistic expression, the law should begin questioning whether Jackson 
Pollock’s painting, pared down to a noncognitive apolitical, timeless artifact, 
should remain the First Amendment’s lodestar. 
CONCLUSION 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the 
Supreme Court stated that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are “unquestionably 
shielded” by the First Amendment.231  Legal commentary seized on that remark as 
a milestone for visual art and an expansive embrace of noncognitive, apolitical 
painting.  This Article explains the intuited constitutional salience of 
nonrepresentational art in relation to the unique art historical, political, and cultural 
conditions of the United States following World War II. 
Yet doctrinal recognition of Jackson Pollock’s work as speech occurred later, in 
and as a cultural disconnect.  Through the Hurley opinion, Pollock’s apolitical 
painting was consecrated as speech in 1995, just as socially-charged postmodern 
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images sparked a vast censorial impulse.  Pollock’s romanticized, heroic brand of 
originality and genius offered a symbolic gloss to the Court’s romantic rhetoric of 
individual autonomy, while in the background, replication, appropriation, and 
social dissent had become prevalent artistic strategies that directly challenged those 
tropes.  The scope of the free speech clause opened wide enough to embrace a dead 
author’s paintings with no discernable message as postmodern artists saw their 
expressive freedom contract due to inappropriate content. 
The response of courts and commentators to Pollock’s position as speech 
extends this disconnect into the new millennium, embracing an intuitively correct 
conclusion while neglecting postmodern artistic practices and theory that have 
redefined art in the past half-century.  A painting by Jackson Pollock neither 
reflects nor speaks to these changes.  As an artifactual remnant of a contingent 
symbolic relationship, the decontextualized drip painting makes an impoverished 
free speech principle.  By revealing modernism’s historical foundation and implicit 
limitations as a postmodern framework, this Article offers a step toward realigning 
First Amendment law with contemporary artistic expression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
